When Weapons Sleep: The Hidden Economics of Military Readiness

I’m writing this article now while listening to the song “Keep the Weapon Awake.” What caught my attention is how it repeats the word “awake” three times.

When I first studied a concept called the economics of readiness, I finally understood the true weight of the phrase “the weapon is awake.” And no, that’s not an exaggeration. Yes, I’m using it as a hook to keep you reading — but I promise, by the end, you’ll understand exactly why I say that.

Let’s begin and uncover some fascinating facts that might completely change how you look at armament and the numerical balance of defense systems among nations.

If I asked you what the most important weapon in the world is right now, your answer would probably be: the F‑35. You’d be right — sharp and well‑informed.

But did you know that it’s also among the least ready weapons in the world? That’s because of the extremely high operational costs borne by the countries that own this system — costs that reach millions of dollars every single year.

I’ll give you an example to show you what I mean — but I’ll ask one thing of you: finish reading this article after you understand the example, and don’t leave before reaching the more important parts ahead…

Imagine this: You’ve bought a Ferrari, but it’s parked in your garage and you can’t drive it because there’s one particular filter that can only be purchased from Ferrari itself. You go down to the local auto workshops asking about it, and everyone tells you: “Sorry, engineer, that filter just isn’t available in the market.”

So you order it directly from the company, and they reply: “Sure.” Then they leave you waiting for months — even though you have an important trip coming up and really need the car.

After a long wait, the filter finally arrives. The company then tells you: “Wait — a Ferrari engineer must come personally to install it.” By the time that happens, you’ve paid for the filter itself, the engineer’s fee, and endured all the waiting in between.

This is precisely what the real economy of defense looks like today.

And why is this topic so important?

Because it completely changes how we measure power — not by the number of aircraft, tanks, or missiles a country owns, but by something far more crucial: its level of readiness. It also forces us to think about operation before acquisition.

For example, the F‑35 program is the most expensive military project in human history. Its total cost has exceeded two trillion dollars.

No, wait a second — stop right there for a moment — because that figure is roughly four times the size of Egypt’s entire economy! Can you imagine that? Tell me honestly — do you really grasp the scale of that number?

Alright, excellent. Now let’s take a closer look at the breakdown of that figure.

Out of the total, 422 billion dollars were allocated for procurement and development, while the remaining 1.58 trillion dollars are dedicated to operating and maintaining the program.

In defense economics, there’s a well‑known pricing framework called the Razor and Blade Model. Why is it called that? The idea comes straight from the name itself: the company sells you the razor at a low price, then later obliges you to buy the blades and the special oil from the same company — at a much higher price.

In the defense sector, the logic is almost identical. The main system is sold at a competitive price, but the spare parts are produced solely by the same company and are extremely expensive. The technical data is owned by that company, the maintenance must be done through it, and the training takes place in accredited institutes under its control. And so, the cycle continues.

That means you are forced into a long‑term relationship with the company — or even the country — from which you bought the weapon. The duration of this relationship equals the operational lifespan of the weapon itself. And that company or country, quite literally, holds you by the hand that hurts the most throughout that entire period.

Even more concerning is that this dependency doesn’t have to be used against you directly. It can come through subtle tactics — like being told “the stock has run out,” or “we’re waiting for a specific component,” or through export and import restrictions imposed either on you directly or on the company you’re dealing with.

And by the way, this isn’t just theoretical talk. In December 2025, just a few weeks ago, the Pentagon’s Office of the Inspector General stated in its report that the readiness rate of F‑35 fighters does not exceed 50%, while the minimum required level is 67%. In other words, you have hangars full of jets — yet only half of them can actually be used.

No, hold on a second… that 50% figure isn’t even for full mission readiness. If we’re talking about complete, operational readiness, the number drops further — down to 30%. Meaning, if you own ten aircraft, only three of them can operate at full capacity.

Now take this surprise — or rather, this shock: did you know that the readiness level for the exact same aircraft in Israel reaches 85%?

While the U.S. Air Force was struggling to raise the readiness of its F‑35A fleet to 51.5%, Israel was operating its 39 F‑35I fighters with a Mission Capability Index of 85%.

During the first phase of the October 2023 war, only five of Israel’s thirty‑nine jets were out of service — yet four of those were repaired immediately, even before the first day of combat officially began.

And on top of that, Israel operates these fighters with a 565% higher average monthly flight hour rate than the U.S. average — without suffering any major drop in readiness.

But the real question is: how did they manage to do that?

I’ll speak here based on the sources I’ve read — though there’s another layer to this story, one I think you’ll grasp without me having to spell it out…

The answer, quite simply, lies in control over the global supply chain for spare parts and technical data.

Israel possesses strategic relationships that allow it to obtain spare parts from U.S. allies in just a matter of days. Wait a second… did you fully catch that? Spare parts for an American aircraft arrive faster in Israel than they do for the U.S. Air Force itself.

On top of that, Israel has developed its own version of the F‑35, featuring local modifications — including an additional fuel tank, domestically produced electronic warfare systems, and advanced weapons of Israeli origin.

And if you think this situation applies only to the United States and the F‑35 program, let’s shift our focus to Germany.

The 2024 report of the German Bundestag’s Armed Forces Commissioner highlighted a persistent shortage of key equipment, spare parts, and ammunition. The deficit became so critical that Germany — a major industrial power — was compelled to dismantle some of its own weapons to use their parts for repairing and operating others, such as the MARDER vehicles that were taken apart to bring other systems back into service.

Consider this point as well: the readiness level of the German Armed Forces today stands at just 50%. Do you know what it was before the Ukraine war? 65%. In other words, it’s declining instead of improving — and forecasts suggest it could drop to 20% by 2027.

As for short-range air defense systems, they’re expected to reach full readiness only by 2029 — and, well… good luck after that.

Please, focus with me here… Germany has been spending on defense at record levels in recent years — yet readiness keeps dropping?

Yes, that’s true. Because the real problem lies in the global supply chains and the local capacity for maintenance and operation. That’s exactly why I told you at the beginning that this dimension is crucial when analyzing defensive capabilities.

And if you’ve made it this far in the article, then you’re truly my friend — and you deserve to know how this dilemma can be solved.

The solution is one most people don’t like to talk about, because it ruins the media shine that usually surrounds every new arms deal. But take this from me — and no one else will tell you this so directly:

Any deal that does not include control over maintenance and data… is an incomplete deal.

Because — if you reflect on everything we’ve discussed — you’ll realize that real transformation doesn’t begin with the question “What will I buy?” — that’s the easy one. It begins with the harder questions: “How will I operate it? At what cost? And who holds the control?”

You must understand that technical data isn’t just paperwork attached at the end of a file. The manuals, testing tools, maintenance center authorizations, and your right to implement local modifications — these aren’t secondary annexes; they are the core.

They are what determine whether you truly own the weapon — or whether you’re merely renting it from the company.

Alright, even if you do manage to obtain the technical data, will you be able to fix everything from day one?

Of course not.

The idea isn’t to turn yourself into a full-scale manufacturer in the first year, but rather to build local maintenance and operational capability gradually. You start with the less sensitive components — the ones that frequently break down and can halt an entire system because of a tiny part — and then move step by step toward the more complex elements… until, eventually, you’ve built a real margin of independence.

And here comes the part that bothers those who care only about appearances: readiness costs money, and its budget must be completely separate from the procurement budget.

The easiest thing in the world is to cut the maintenance budget just to fund a new deal and look impressive in front of the public.

But that isn’t “saving” — it’s sabotaging the entire defense capability.

Readiness must have its own dedicated maintenance and operations budget, just like the salary or electricity items in a company’s accounts.

You can’t cut it in the name of buying a new coffee machine, because by doing so, you’re simply trading real capability for decorative illusion.

The final solution — or rather, the final strategic awareness — is to understand that the stockpile of spare parts is not a luxury; it’s a doctrine.

A country that introduces new weapon systems without calculating a spare‑parts stock for the coming years isn’t solving a problem — it’s buying a delayed one. And it’s not a minor problem either.

It’s a problem that appears on the day of crisis — when you suddenly realize that a component the size of your palm, by merely being absent, has turned your entire system into scrap metal.

Or perhaps the part does exist, but it’s stored far away, or trapped under export restrictions, or you’re simply waiting your turn like any other customer.

At that moment, the number of jets or tanks you possess ceases to have any real meaning.

And it’s precisely for this reason that readiness itself becomes a geopolitical weapon.

A weapon without missiles — built instead on paper, technical specifications, and supply chains.

And it doesn’t need to be used against you in an overt way.

A slight delay in delivery, a shortage in stock, an export restriction, a pause in certifying your maintenance center, or a missing component in a spare‑parts shipment — that’s all it takes.

In that moment, you’ll realize that you may have a weapon, but it isn’t awake.

And the nation that truly understands defense economics knows this truth well: sovereignty isn’t achieved by purchasing arms — but by mastering their operation.